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INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Lisbon Treaty brought among numerous
changes, a provision which explicitly now allows Member States
to withdraw from the European Union. While some scholars
have begun to examine the provision,1 it is surprising that they
are analyzing the clause in isolation. Yet, if one had to categorize
the concept of withdrawal, most likely, it would fall into the
camp of disintegrating provisions, which therefore are in stark
contrast with any provisions that could be considered as
integrating norms; an obvious example for this latter category
* Faculty Academic Fellow, School of Law, University of Lancaster. I am grateful to
Associate Professor in Law Tawhida Ahmed, em. Professor Sandy Ghandhi and
Professor Steven Wheatley for comments on an earlier draft; all errors, of course,
remain mine. The author can be contacted at c.rieder@lancaster.ac.uk.
1. See, e.g., Anna Wyrozumska, Withdrawal from the Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION
AFTER LISBON: CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, ECONOMIC ORDER AND EXTERNAL ACTION 343
(Hermann Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds., 2012); Hannes Hofmeister, ‘Should I
Stay or Should I Go?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, 16 EUR. L.J.
589 (2010).
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would be EU citizenship. The claim that is made in this Article is
that in order to fully understand the application and the
functioning of the withdrawal clause, it is necessary to
accommodate the tensions between integration and
disintegration—between ‘citizenship’ and ‘withdrawal.’
The withdrawal clause comes at a time when it seems no
longer unthinkable for a Member State to ‘reduce’ membership
obligations or even completely withdraw from the European
Union. The case of the United Kingdom is interesting in two
ways: first, in his speech on Europe, Prime Minister David
Cameron promised an in-or-out referendum on EU
membership;2 one can take this as an example of voluntary loss
of EU membership. The case of Scotland, on the other hand,
would be an example of involuntary loss of membership;
Scotland has announced a referendum about its independence
from the United Kingdom, which is scheduled for 2014.3 One
aspect of the discussion for and against independence is
whether Scotland could remain an EU Member State.4
Apart from these rather extreme and maybe exceptional
cases mentioned above, it seems, as Piris points out, that “the
time is approaching when the choice will be between the status
quo, which might mean a diluted European Union, slowly
stagnating and becoming irrelevant, and a European Union that
accepts, as a temporary measure, more differentiation between
its Member States.”5 The withdrawal clause may have its role to
play in this process. If this is so, and keeping in mind the two
above examples, it is necessary to clearly define the normative
and doctrinal limits of this clause.
2. U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, Speech Regarding Referendum on British
Membership in the European Union (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum.
3. Severin Carrell, Alex Salmond Announces Scottish Independence Referendum Date,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/mar/
21/scottish-independence-referendum-date.
4. Cf. James Crawford & Alan Boyle, ANNEX A OPINION: REFERENDUM ON THE
INDEPENDENCE ON SCOTLAND—INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS (2013), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/794
08/Annex_A.pdf; Scottish Independence: EC’s Barroso Says New States Need ‘‘Apply to Join
EU”, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012, 3:11 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotlandscotland-politics-20664907.
5. JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A TWO-SPEED EU? 147
(2012).
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The only ‘test case’ of complete ‘withdrawal’ that exists at
this point is the rather special case of Greenland, which stems
from the mid-1980s. When the Danish electorate decided to
accede to the European Union, the people of Greenland
opposed that move, but nevertheless had to follow because they
were part of the Danish territory. Yet, over the years, what was to
be observed was a form of devolution that took place in which
powers were transferred from Denmark back to Greenland
culminating in a 1982 referendum concerning whether
Greenland was to remain within the European Union.6 It is
worth pointing out that the subsequent request to ‘withdraw’
from the European Union was not made by Greenland itself, but
by Denmark in order to renegotiate the application of the
Treaties to its territory;7 needless to say, Member States were
rather sensitive with regard to Greenland’s wishes given the
colonial context.8
Despite the case above, generally there has always been a
debate as to whether withdrawal from the European Union is
possible at all under EU law. Heated discussions also took place
in the Constitutional Convention, which drafted the withdrawal
clause originally for the Constitutional Treaty. 9 There were
delegates who saw withdrawal as acceptable according to the
principles of international law, and those who considered
withdrawal incompatible with EU law in general. One viewpoint
that represented the conservative or traditional side was
expressed by the delegate of the Austrian Government, Hannes
Farnleitner, who argued that “[t]he provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provide a sufficient basis for
termination of membership.”10 On the other side, there were
delegates such as the representatives of the Dutch government
who pointed out “that facilitating the possibility to withdraw
6. MICHAEL SWEITZER ET AL., EUROPARECHT: DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN
UNION 37 (2007) (Ger.).
7. Wyrozumska, supra note 1, at 343–44.
8. Raymond J. Friel, Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU:
Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution, 53 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 407, 409–11 (2004).
9. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. I-60, 2004 O.J. C 310/1,
at 40 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty].
10. Hannes Farnleitner, Suggestion for Amendment of Article I-59, available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/46_Art%20I%2059%20
Farnleitner%20EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
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from the Union [was] contrary to the idea of European
integration as set out in the preamble of the TEU [which]:
‘[r]esolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe’.”11 Despite that discussion, the
clause not only made it into the failed Constitutional Treaty but
was one of the provisions which was preserved and transplanted
into the Lisbon Treaty as the new article 50 of the Treaty of the
European Union (“TEU”).12
This paper is pragmatic with regard to the question as to
whether the withdrawal clause should exist at all in the first
place. The question is, ‘Who should stop a Member State willing
to cut off ties completely with the EU?’ Nevertheless, the
argument is normative when it comes to the question of ‘how
the withdrawal clause has to be understood or applied?’—this is
a question that clearly has implications on a future relationship
between the withdrawn Member State and the European Union.
In order to develop the argument, this Article first identifies the
principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the
“Vienna Convention”) with regard to withdrawal.13 Second, this
Article will discuss the withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty
itself. In the last section, this Article will add the issue of
citizenship to the discourse on withdrawal, and it will evaluate
whether this has any implications on how withdrawal by a
Member State can be executed.
I. WITHDRAWAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
This first section will outline the parameters of withdrawal
under international law. Despite the fact that there now exists a
specific provision on withdrawal within the EU framework, it is
nevertheless useful to briefly provide an overview of the
withdrawal framework under international law, and identify its
11. G.M. de Vries & T.J.A.M. de Bruijn, Suggestion for Amendment of Article : 46,
available at http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/46/art46vriesEN.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
12. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 50, 2012 O.J. C
326/13, at 43–44 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty
Establishing the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Including Protocols and Annexes, will be referred to as the “Lisbon
Treaty” throughout this Article.
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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guiding principles such as the role of state-sovereignty or
whether unilateral withdrawal from a treaty is possible. After all,
the conceptual ideas between ‘withdrawal’ on the international
and the European level are the same; withdrawal allows for a
state to exit a treaty.
Section 3 of the Vienna Convention offers detailed and
numerous provisions on the specific question of “Termination
and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties.” For the purposes
of this Article, the focus will be on two specific articles: (1)
article 54, which stipulates withdrawal from a treaty either
through its own provisions or by consent among the parties of
the treaty; and (2) article 56, which regulates withdrawal from a
treaty if there exists no provision in the treaty and if no consent
can be reached among the parties involved. The core difference
between these two provisions seems to be that where article 54 is
based on a form of “consensualism,” this dimension is absent in
article 56.14
As pointed out, article 54 of the Vienna Convention allows
for withdrawal from a treaty if this is agreed by the parties. This
agreement or consensus can come in two ways: first, consent of
the parties with regard to withdrawal or termination can be
expressed in the treaty itself through a specific clause, but must
be “in conformity with the provisions of the treaty.” 15 As a
consequence, at one point in the drafting history, the provision
was removed. In the final version, however, the clause was
included once again “for the sake of clarity.”16 Article 50 of the
TEU, the withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty, is such a
specific provision.
Second, article 54 of the Vienna Convention also allows for
a more ad hoc termination of, or withdrawal from, a treaty. After
all, a treaty can be terminated or a party can withdraw from one
“[a]t any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States.”17 The obvious question to ask for

14. Theodore Christakis, Article 56, 1969 Vienna Convention, in 2 THE VIENNA
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1251, 1252–53 (Olivier
Korten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(a), at 344.
16 . Vincent Chapaux, Article 54, 1969 Vienna Convention, in 2 THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 1236, 1238.
17. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(b), at 345 (emphasis added).
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the purposes of this Article is whether this provision, in light of
the Lisbon Treaty, is now superfluous. With regard to
termination, an argument can certainly be made that the Lisbon
Treaty has no specific provisions and therefore article 54 still has
its role to play.
The second provision that this Article will examine is article
56 of the Vienna Convention. The norm seems to “establish[] a
general presumption against unilateral denunciation.” 18 The
Article stipulates that “[a] treaty which contains no provision
regarding its termination and which does not provide for
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or
withdrawal.”19 What is firmly established is that “[t]he customary
character of the ban on unilateral denunciation, enunciated as a
matter of principle in the introductory phrase of the first
paragraph of Article 56, is beyond doubt.”20 To offer a rather
extreme example: not even Hitler’s Germany invoked a right of
unilateral withdrawal, but argued instead that the other parties
to the Treaty of Versailles were in breach of their obligations.21
However, the provision also offers two exceptions: first,
withdrawal is possible if “the parties intended to admit the
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal;”22 and second, “a right
of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the
treaty.”23
Withdrawal based on the intention is relatively undisputed
as a concept of customary law. None of the participating states at
the Sixth Committee or at the Vienna Conference opposed this
provision. 24 Also, whenever unilateral withdrawal became an
issue there was no discussion of “whether paragraph 1(a)
reflected the state of customary law, but the manner in which
the intention of the parties was to be assessed in each particular
case.”25 At the same time the concept is notoriously difficult to

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Christakis, supra note 14, at 1257.
Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 56.1, at 345.
Christakis, supra note 14, at 1255.
See id. at 1262.
Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 56.1(a), at 345 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 56.1(b), at 345 (emphasis added).
See Christakis, supra note 14, at 1255–56.
Id. at 1256.
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establish given the fact that “intention” indicates a “subjective
element”26 which has an exclusive internal dimension.
However, as indicated, withdrawal is also possible if it is in
the “nature of the treaty.” Whether this is the case or not—at
least in theory—can be established “objectively.” At the same
time, the status of article 56.1(b) as a norm of customary
international law seems far more questionable. This provision,
which was sponsored by the United Kingdom, made it into the
treaty at a very late stage of the negotiation process and was only
passed by a rather narrow majority. “Given this legislative
history, it is not surprising that the doctrine, almost
unanimously, continues to doubt the customary character of
paragraph 1(b) of Article 56.”27
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht, which sits in
Karlsruhe and is the enfant terrible of European integration,
upheld the right to unilateral withdrawal in its Maastricht
decision with what seems to be a distant resemblance of the
ideology of “Blood (Volk) and Soil (Staat).” 28 In their
judgement,29 the judges quite clearly articulated that “Germany
is one of the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ who expressed their will to
be bound by the indefinitely concluded EU treaty and in this
way established a long lasting membership, which however can be
dissolved by an act to the contrary.”30 The judges justified their
conclusion by making reference to “state-sovereignty”;31 in light

26. Id. at 1266.
27. Id. at 1256.
28. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the
German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219, 223 (1995). For a critical discussion of the
Maastricht judgment, see Jochen A. Frowein, Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT 1 (1994).
29. Although, as Weiler notes, not without irony, “[r]ecently [the court] decided
that its judges should be referred to in English as ‘Justices.’ Priceless!” Joseph. H.H.
Weiler, Editorial, Judicial Ego, 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (2011).
30. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12,
1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (para.
112) (Ger.) (“Deutschland ist einer der ‘Herren der Verträge’, die ihre Gebundenheit
an den ‘auf unbegrenzte Zeit’ geschlossenen Unions-Vertrag . . . mit dem Willen zur
langfristigen Mitgliedschaft begründet haben, diese Zugehörigkeit aber letztlich durch
einen gegenläufigen Akt auch wieder aufheben könnten.” (emphasis added) (author’s
own translation)).
31. Id. (“Deutschland wahrt damit die Qualität eines souveränen Staates . . . .”).
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of the above, such a claim seems far less persuasive than
suggested by the judges.32
This is not to argue that sovereignty has no role to play, but
it is only relevant when a state makes a decision either to join or
remain outside a treaty framework; state sovereignty makes the
decision a voluntary one.33 This means, however, that “there is
nothing shocking in the idea that States, which are not forced to
enter into a treaty regime, may have difficulty leaving it.”34 If one
accepts this reasoning, then sovereignty does not necessarily
“impl[y] an inalienable right”35 to withdraw even if unilateral
withdrawal may be considered to be an expression of
sovereignty. What follows from all of these considerations is that
a state which decides to withdraw unilaterally acts against
international law unless it can invoke other justifications for
doing so. Thus, sovereignty alone does not offer a sufficient and
solid enough normative basis.
What is to be concluded from all of these considerations?
Sovereignty, as a concept, does not seem normatively persuasive
to justify unilateral withdrawal. Therefore, the argument made
by the German Constitutional Court that an actus contrarius is
sufficient to absolve a state from the obligations under the
Treaty is not convincing. Nevertheless, sovereignty has a role to
play as it serves as a safeguard which guarantees that a state is
either free to join a treaty or not; in other words, it injects the
voluntary element at the beginning of a contractual
relationship. Thus, an argument can be made that a form of
metamorphosis takes place once a state has joined a treaty, which
leads to a limitation of possibilities once joined. The following
section will now move the analysis from the general provision of
withdrawal under international law to the lex specialis of the
Lisbon Treaty.

32. Frowein, supra note 28, at 11.
33. DJURA NINČIĆ, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 26 (1970).
34. Christakis, supra note 14, at 1264.
35. Hans Kelsen, Withdrawal from the United Nations, 1 W. POL. Q. 29, 33 (1948).
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II. WITHDRAWAL UNDER EU LAW
Withdrawal from the European Union is regulated in
article 50 of the TEU. What is rather obvious to notice is that the
matter of withdrawal is dealt with in only one single and rather
short provision. This somehow seems surprising given the
significance and complexity of a potential withdrawal from the
European Union. The wording of the clause can be considered
‘rather broad’ as it allows not only for consensual, but also for
unilateral, withdrawal. This section will outline the structure of
the provision and highlight some of its problems before it is
discussed in the light of EU citizenship in the next section.
According to article 50.1 of the TEU, “[a]ny Member State
may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its
own constitutional requirements.”36 The problem one encounters
with this provision is that it would seem that it is the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) which would be called on to decide
whether a Member State (rebus sic stantibus) has in fact
withdrawn in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements. This means, as a consequence, that “this insertion
has catapulted that court [ECJ] into the role of final arbiter of a
significant issue of national constitutional law.”37 Needless to say,
this could embroil the ECJ in questions which are highly
sensitive for the withdrawing Member State.
Secondly, it remains rather unclear what the phrase means
for Member States which have an integration-friendly
constitution, such as Germany. The Preamble of the German
Basic Law reads that “[c]onscious of their responsibility before
God and man, [i]nspired by the determination to promote
world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German
people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted
this Basic Law.” 38 In its Solange II ruling, the judges of the
German Constitutional Court acknowledged that provisions in
36. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 43 (emphasis added).
37. Friel, supra note 8, at 425. But see Wyrozumska, supra note 1, at 359 (“Friel’s
[sic] fears seem, however, unsupported by the Treaty provisions and the ECJ case law.
The ECJ has no competence under the Lisbon Treaty to adjudicate upon validity of the
internal law procedures in similar situations, and the Court was consequently rejecting
its competence in similar cases.”).
38. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, pmbl. (Ger.).
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the German Basic Law need to be interpreted in relation to each
other (“normativen Sinneinheit”)39 and this includes a reading of
constitutional provisions also in the light of the Preamble.
Following this reasoning, it seems rather questionable how a
complete withdrawal from the European Union could be
justified. It appears that the German Constitutional Court either
deliberately abandoned or was oblivious of this reasoning in its
Maastricht decision.
A second condition, according to article 50.2 of the TEU,
which needs to be fulfilled by the withdrawing member state, is
that it has to “notify the European Council of its intention.”40
What follows then “[i]n the light of the guidelines provided by
the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude
an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future
relationship with the Union.”41 A reading of the provision, so
far, seems to suggest that a Member State can leave the
European Union only in a consensual way. This finding,
however, as will be shown below, needs to be qualified.
The agreement to be concluded between the withdrawing
state and the Council, which acts on behalf of the European
Union according to Article 50.2 “acting by a qualified majority,
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,” has to
follow the procedure as outlined in Article 218.3 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).42 Thus,
whereas the agreement about withdrawal is to be concluded
between the European Union and the respective member
state,43 the accession treaty, according to Article 49 of the TEU,
is one “between the Member States and the applicant State.”44
Again one could make reference to the concept of metamorphosis
taking place between accession and withdrawal.
39. Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 5,
2012, 73 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVERFGE] 339 (¶ 131)
(Ger.).
40. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 43.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See id. (“[The agreement for withdrawal] shall be negotiated in accordance
with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”).
43. See Jochen Herbst, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union:
Who Are the “Masters of the Treaties”?, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1755, 1758 (2005).
44. TEU, supra note 12, art. 49, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 43.
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It may be worth pointing out, especially in the light of later
normative considerations, that the ECJ has a role to play in
examining this agreement because it forms part of EU law.45 The
jurisdiction of the Court comes in two ways: as judicial review
and in the form of an Opinion. With regard to the former,
Lazowski points out that “the decisions on signature and
approval of the agreement may be subject to judicial review”46
according to article 263 of the TFEU. With regard to the latter,
article 218.11 of the TFEU entitles Member States, the EU
Parliament, Council, or Commission to request an Opinion
from the ECJ as to whether the agreement concluded is in line
with Treaty requirements.47
If an agreement is finally reached, according to article 50.3
of the TEU, “[t]he Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal
agreement.” 48 At the same time, however, the provision also
allows for a unilateral withdrawal if, two years after the
notification, no agreement can be reached.49 The time period,
which can also be extended by the European Council in an
agreement with the withdrawing Member State, has positive and
negative aspects. On the positive side one could argue that a
two-year period can allow for a ‘cooling off’; on the other hand,
the time span leads to uncertainty and potential blackmailing.
One cannot rule out that a Member State could threaten
with a form of “putative withdrawal.”50 This would amount to
nothing more than a theatre on the supranational stage for a
national audience which, however, puts a heavy burden on the
EU institutions and their capacity to solve problems. There are
also concerns that the automatism at the end of the two-year
time frame may undermine serious talks for an agreement
because the withdrawing Member State knows that “after 2 years
45. See Adam Lazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to
Membership, 37 EUR. L. REV. 523, 528 (2012).
46. Id.
47. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 218.11, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 146 [hereinafter TFEU] (“Where the opinion
of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is
amended or the Treaties are revised.”).
48. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.3, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44.
49. See id.
50. Friel, supra note 8, at 426.
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withdrawal will take effect in any event.”51 However, invoking the
“principle of sincere cooperation” in article 4.3 of the TEU as a
safeguard runs into the usual difficulties of substantiating the
raised claims sufficiently.52
Another crucial aspect which is addressed in article 50.4 of
the TEU is the question of how to deal with the representatives
of the withdrawing Member State within the institutional
framework of the European Union. The provision states that
“the member of the European Council or of the Council
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate
in the discussions of the European Council or in decisions
concerning it.” 53 The provision is clear and also seems
conceptually sound: according to article 10.2 of the TEU,
“Member States are represented in the European Council by
their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to
their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.”54 Members in
the (European) Council thus represent the citizens/nationals of
the state and therefore their primary concern, especially in the
critical circumstances of a withdrawal process, is located with the
state.
The provision, however, is silent about the status of MEPs
from the withdrawing Member State. Hofmeister seems to be
rather critical of the logical conclusion that MEPs continue to be
allowed in the decision making process, even if related to
withdrawal; he is also rather concerned that they may influence
the decision-making process in a certain way. 55 However, he
appears to be oblivious to the conceptual role of the EU
Parliament which is to “directly [represent citizens] at Union
level”; 56 or as Dougan phrased it: “directly elected MEPs
represent the collective interests of Union citizens rather than
the parochial interests of the withdrawing state.” 57 Despite
51. Id.
52. Cf. Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-96/81, [1982] E.C.R. I-1791.
53. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.4, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44.
54. Id. art. 10.2, at 20.
55. See Hofmeister, supra note 1, at 594.
56. TEU, supra note 12, art. 10.2, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 20.
57. Michael Dougan, The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: A ‘Tidying-Up
Exercise’ that Needs Some Tidying-Up of Its Own, 27 FED. TR. CONST. ONLINE PAPER SERIES
1, 8 (2003).
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Dougan’s acknowledgement of the institutional role of
parliament, he nevertheless argues against their inclusion in the
process as he seems more concerned that “national loyalties of
its MEPs . . . take precedence over the general Union interest
they were originally elected to represent.”58 However, one will
always face the problem that some representatives of an
institution understand and accept the role of the institution they
are serving, whereas others will not.
In turn, an argument could be made that allowing MEPs to
still participate in the process of withdrawal limits the violation
of a “key tenet of democratic theory”59 that is “the principle of
affected interests.” 60 The principle requires that “[e]veryone
who is affected by the decisions of a government should have
the right to participate in that government.”61 The argument to
be made is that because MEPs are elected by EU citizens, this
allows nationals from other EU Member States who are living on
the territory of the withdrawing state to have at least some
representation in the political process of withdrawal; this would
alleviate the problem that they may be excluded from the
national political process/discourse of withdrawal.
It should be noted that article 50.5 of the TEU also allows
the withdrawing Member State to rejoin. 62 In such a case,
however, the state would have to follow the normal procedure
for accession according to article 49 of the TEU. This means
that, first of all, a member state has no automatic right to rejoin
and, second, that it would have to take over the complete acquis
communautaire. As a consequence, any previous opt-outs would
be lost unless they can be renegotiated again.63

58. Id.
59 . Chris Hilson, EU Citizenship and the Principle of Affectedness, in MAKING
EUROPEAN CITIZENS: CIVIC INCLUSION IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT 56, 56 (Richard
Bellamy et al. eds., 2006).
60. See ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY
49 (Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1990).
61. Id.
62. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.5, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44 (“If a State which has
withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure
referred to in Article 49.”).
63. See ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 26–27 (3d ed. 2013).
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What can be concluded is that the withdrawal clause allows
for both unilateral as well as consensual withdrawal. It is clear
that although the normative arguments to be made in the
subsequent section are of little practical value, they are still of
moral value if a Member State is determined enough to
withdraw unilaterally. The normative dimension, more likely,
will translate into a practice in case of consensual withdrawal
executed through an agreement. These normative principles,
which will be identified in the following section, describe the
outer limits, or red lines, not to be overstepped in an agreement
concluded by the European Union with a withdrawing Member
State. In addition, the fact that the ECJ can be involved in
reviewing the concluded agreement between the European
Union and the withdrawing Member State may help to translate
these normative principles—what ought to be—into reality—
what is.
III. WITHDRAWAL AND EU CITIZENSHIP
The previous section outlined the structure and some of
the legal problems of the withdrawal clause, which can be
described as a provision of disintegration. This section will
examine the withdrawal clause in the context of citizenship—a
concept that resembles integration. What is to be examined is
whether this link between ‘withdrawal’ and ‘EU citizenship’
must lead to a different understanding of the withdrawal clause
compared to that suggested in the previous section and
literature so far. An obvious consequence of withdrawal from
the European Union is a loss or change of the individual’s status
as an EU citizen. Therefore in this section, a three-step
argument will be developed. The first subsection examines the
status of the individual in EU law. The second subsection focuses
on the question of whether involuntary loss of citizenship can be
normatively justified on the national level; this, it can be argued,
simulates, mutis mutandi, the situation after withdrawal. The final
subsection analyzes whether the findings made with regard to
involuntary loss of national citizenship can in fact be transferred
from national citizenship to EU citizenship.
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A. The Role of the Individual in EU Law
The argument which is made throughout this section is that
the individual has a role to play in the process of withdrawal.
This is achieved by treating the individual like a ‘subject’ and
not a mere ‘object.’ What can be observed in European
integration is a continued strengthening of the status of the
individual, starting almost from the very beginning, which found
its focal point later, with the introduction of EU citizenship in
the Maastricht Treaty.64 Ever since the formal introduction of
EU citizenship the ECJ has further shaped and, one could
probably argue, strengthened, the concept of EU citizenship.
For the purposes of this Article, there is no need to rehearse the
case law history.65 This subsection will focus exclusively on the
role and status of the individual in EU law.
As early as 1963, the Court was already laying the
foundation for later developments with regard to the status of
the individual in EU law and the role of sovereignty of Member
States in the famous case van Gend en Loos. 66 The Court
highlighted how the European Economic Community (“EEC”)
Treaty moves beyond a traditional international law agreement
among sovereign states, by making reference to the preamble of
the treaty “which refers not only to governments but to peoples.”67
Therefore, the exercise of power of these institutions “affects
Member States and . . . their citizens.”68 Clearly, the EEC law
acknowledged, from a very early point onwards, the existence of
individuals as a distinct entity. What is noteworthy, however, is
that while individuals were acknowledged as ‘subjects’ at this
early stage of integration, citizens were exclusively defined
through Member States and still clearly ‘belonged’ to the
Member States as ‘their citizens.’

64. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, art. 8, 1992 O.J. C
191/1, at 7 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
65. For a summary of this development, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Present and the
Future of EU Citizenship: A Bird’s Eye View of the Legal Debate (Jean Monnet Program,
Working Paper No. 02, 2012), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/
papers/12/1202.html.
66. Van Gend & Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R.
I-3 (English special edition).
67. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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What goes hand in hand with this development is a change
in the understanding of the nature of EU law. The Court in van
Gend en Loos concluded that “the Community constitutes a new
legal order of international law.”69 One year later, in Costa, one
finds an even more daring Court that already contrasts EU law
with international law: “[b]y contrast with ordinary international
treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system.”70 In
Opinion 1/91, the Court went even further and held that the
(then) EEC treaty “constitutes the constitutional charter of a
Community based on the rule of law.”71
Given this change of terminology away from the
‘international’ to the more ‘national,’ it does not come as a
surprise that eventually this development led to the introduction
of citizenship in article 8.1 EC of the Maastricht Treaty. This
provision was originally rather bold as it read that “[c]itizenship
of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”72
The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty added the sentence that
“[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace
national citizenship.” 73 This addition foreshadowed, but also
should settle, potential tensions between the national and the
supranational level. At the same time, an argument can be made
that EU citizens were mainly defined through the nation state.
The failed Constitutional Treaty is interesting because, so it
seems, citizens finally stepped out of the shadow of the Member
States. The Preamble, for example, read that the Convention
prepared the draft “of this Constitution on behalf of the
citizens.”74 Furthermore, article I-1 of the Constitutional Treaty
spoke of the “will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a
common future.”75 It almost seems to be an allusion to the idea
of a ‘social contract’ where there are three parties involved in
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. I-587, 593 (emphasis added) (English
special edition).
71. Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-6099, 6102 (emphasis added).
72. Maastricht TEU, supra note 64, art. 8.1, 1992 O.J. C 191, at 7.
73. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340, at
25 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
74. Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl., 2004 O.J. C 310, at 3.
75. Id. art. I-1, at 11.
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the process that are presumably of equal weight: citizens,
Member States, and the Union.
However, with the Lisbon Treaty the language used by the
Treaties becomes more careful again. Article 1 of the TEU once
again refers exclusively to the “High Contracting Parties” which
establish a Union “among themselves.” And, once again, we
learn about the “process of creating an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe.”76 Thus, it almost seems that the clear
language of the social contract which was still applied in the
Constitutional Treaty is now absent again. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note a change or sharing of “possession” of
citizens takes place where they are no longer considered to
belong exclusively to the Member States but also to the
European Union. Of course, with Weiler one could ask whether
it should not be the case that it is “Europe which belongs to
citizens”;77 this, however, is another discussion.
Article 3.1 of the TEU nevertheless suggests a more direct
link between the Union and its citizens: “[t]he Union’s aim is to
promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.”78 In
addition, article 3.2 of the TEU establishes that “[t]he Union
shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice
without internal frontiers.”79 Article 13.1 of the TEU prescribes
that “[t]he Union shall have an institutional framework which
shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its
interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States.”80 This
provision clearly suggests that there is a distinction to be made
between citizens on the one hand, and Member States on the
other.
What can be concluded is that the individual has a rather
strong and a unique role in EU law compared to international
law. This finding is also confirmed by the reasoning of the Court
which does not consider EU law as an element of (traditional)
international law. Member States accommodated this different
approach by eventually introducing the concept of EU
76. TEU, supra note 12, art. 1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 16.
77. Joseph H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen–Eros and Civilization, 4 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 495, 500 (1997).
78. TEU, supra note 12, art. 3.1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 17 (emphasis added).
79. Id. art. 3.2, at 17 (emphasis added).
80. Id. art. 13.1, at 22 (emphasis added).

164 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:147
citizenship, which somehow crystallizes this development even if
the legislative history shows a certain uneasiness with the
concept of citizenship on the supranational level. The next
subsection will discuss the possibility of involuntary loss of
citizenship on the national level which may serve as a simulation
for the loss of EU citizenship after withdrawal from the
European Union.
B. The (Involuntary) Loss of Citizenship
The point to be made in this subsection is that “citizenship
is a Stand, a status”81 of the individual within or opposite the
collective, which, because of its fundamental importance,
cannot be simply taken away by the majority. In this regard the
protection of the status of citizenship is rather different
compared to one, admittedly extreme, example of the forced
removal of citizenship within living history—the Nazi treatment
of some of their citizens; Jews, for example, were regularly
stripped of this crucial status before they were killed in the
concentration camps.82 So, an argument can be made that even
the Nazis acknowledged the importance of the status as such
even though they did not hesitate to carry out such acts as they
did.
The US Supreme Court developed a position which
highlighted the role of citizenship as conferring a status on the
individual. Chief Justice Warren stated in Perez v. Brownell that
[c]itizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than
the right to have rights. . . . In this country the expatriate
would presumably enjoy, at most, only the limited rights and
privileges of aliens, and like the alien he might even be
subject to deportation and thereby deprived of the right to
assert any rights.83

The ECJ in Grzelczyk equally seems to acknowledge the
importance of the status of citizenship; even if, given its civil law
tradition, in far less prosaic words: “Union citizenship is

81. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY
62 (1992).
82. Id. at 167–68.
83. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64–65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the
Member States . . . .” 84 There seems to be a considerable
overlap between the ECJ’s and US Supreme Court’s
understanding of the role of citizenship as an instrument that
establishes status.
Loss of citizenship can come in two ways: either people lose
citizenship with their consent (voluntary) or without consent
(involuntary). Whether both are equally permissible has been
the discussion of a series of judgments by the US Supreme
Court. The principles developed by the Court may be worth
outlining for the purposes of this Article as they may provide a
useful (normative) guideline also for the EU context. The case
of Mackenzie v. Hare 85 offers aspects for both dimensions, even
if, as will be seen, the judgment stretches the word ‘voluntary’ by
any means. 86 According to the relevant law at the time, an
American woman, Ms. Mackenzie, lost her citizenship as a
consequence of marriage with a British man. Yet Ms. Mackenzie
claimed that “such legislation, if intended to apply to her, is
beyond the authority of Congress.” 87 One of the arguments
made to support her case was that citizenship “became a right,
privilege, and immunity which could not be taken away from her
except as a punishment for crime or by her voluntary
expatriation.”88
The US Supreme Court, however, was not sympathetic to
Ms. Mackenzie and found the law which deprived her of
citizenship to be constitutional because the legislature did not
act arbitrarily, and also considered the loss of citizenship in this
case as one to be “elected.”89 In the eyes of the Court, the case
therefore came under the heading of “voluntary expatriation.”90
The extent to which ‘consent’ as a concept may be stretched,
however, is open for discussion; one could make the argument
that consent also has a role to play in the context of loss of
citizenship following withdrawal, if one considers the following:
84. Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Case C184/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-6139, ¶ 31.
85. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
86. Cf. Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L. J. 1164, 1179 (1955).
87. 239 U.S. at 307.
88. Id. at 308.
89. Id. at 312.
90. Comment, supra note 86, at 1171 & n.36.
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withdrawal is a consequence of a political process, and,
therefore, one could argue that at least a majority has consented
to withdrawal and hence their loss of citizenship.
The argument, however, is not without problems for at least
two groups of people. The first group consists of people who
were entitled to vote, but said explicitly ‘no’ to withdrawal; in
this context it seems difficult to construct a form of ‘implied’ or
‘indirect’ consent. The second category consists of either people
who are excluded from the political process because they are
not citizens of the withdrawing member state, but are still
affected because they live on the territory; or they are simply too
young to be entitled to participate in the political deliberation
process.91 What, from a normative perspective, is particularly
problematic is that it is not only impossible to construct
‘consent’ as a justifying means with regard to the loss of
citizenship but in addition for the second group of people they
also experience a violation of the “principle of affectedness”;92
as has been pointed out already this principle is rather crucial in
democratic theory.
Originally the US Supreme Court in Mackenzie based its
decision not only on the consent argument, but also made it
clear that the US Congress has the power to revoke citizenship
even against the will of a person. The Court concluded that the
US Congress, in fact, has these powers, at least to the extent “as
a ‘necessary and proper’ incident to its ‘sovereign’ power in the
area of foreign affairs.”93 The US Supreme Court similarly found
that the US Congress has the power to deprive a person of the
citizenship status against their will in Perez v. Brownell.94 If this
were to be the normatively convincing approach then, as a
consequence, people in these two groups described above would
have no case because they could be deprived of their status
anyway—even against their will. The argument would end here.

91. This is particularly problematic because it is especially young people who are
more in favor of European integration. See Eurobarometer, 72 Nationaler Bericht:
Österreich 32 fig. (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
eb/eb72/eb72_at_at_nat.pdf.
92. See Hilson, supra note 59, at 56.
93. Comment, supra note 86, at 1177.
94. See 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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What is interesting to note, however, is that Chief Justice
Warren, in his dissenting opinion in Brownell developed a rather
different conceptual understanding of citizens and citizenship.
He made the point that
[C]itizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not
subject to the general powers of their government.
Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the
conduct and affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a
government of the people cannot take away their citizenship
simply because one branch of that government can be said
to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so.95

What this means, in other words, is that the individual is
protected against the decision of a majority. However, in Afroyim
v. Rusk, the US Supreme Court overruled its findings in Perez v.
Brownell, and followed the reasoning outlined by Chief Justice
Warren ten years earlier. 96 A similar problem in a slightly
different context is also to be found in the rather recent
examples of separation having taken place in Europe. 97 The
solution seems to be very much in line with the principle of “the
sovereign citizen” identified by Chief Justice Warren. Despite
the fact that a majority had voted in favor of separation in the
case of Czechoslovakia, the legal framework put in place allowed
for the individual to make a choice of which citizenship to
adopt; article 3(2) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms allowed Czechs and Slovaks to choose their own
nationality following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia:
“[e]verybody has the right freely to choose his nationality. It is
prohibited to influence this choice in any way.” 98 Another
example would be Opinion No. 2 of the Badinter Arbitration
Committee at the conference on Yugoslavia which also
recommended that individuals ought to have the nationality of

95. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
96. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
97 . I am grateful to Dr. James Summers for providing me with these two
examples.
98. Ústavní zákon č 2/1993 Sb., Listina Základních Práv a Svobod [Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms] art. 3(2) (Czech), translated in Parliament of
the Czech Republic, Chamber of Deputies, Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic
Freedoms, available at http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/1993/2.html.
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their choice;99 again, despite a majority decision, the individual
should have the last say on their individual status.
If one transfers the gist of the argument from Chief Justice
Warren’s reasoning that “citizens themselves are sovereign”100
and “a government of the people cannot take away their
citizenship,”101 this effectively limits the room for maneuver of a
government. One reaches a similar conclusion also when
drawing on examples of European self-determination. If one
takes these principles out of the state context and applies them
in the context of withdrawal from the European Union, what
one would need to conclude is that a Member State
(government) could not simply strip people of EU citizenship
against their will. This, however, would mean that even if a
majority of people in a referendum may be in favor of withdrawal
from the European Union, a way would nevertheless need to be
found to accommodate the right of individuals to retain EU
citizenship if they wanted to. The next subsection will analyze
whether it is possible to apply the reasoning made with regard to
national citizenship in the context of EU citizenship.
C. The (Involuntary) Loss of EU citizenship
As outlined in the previous section, one obvious
consequence of withdrawal is that according to article 50.3 of
the TEU (at one point) “[t]he Treaties shall cease to apply.”102
As such, article 20 of the TFEU, which confers on the individual
person EU citizenship, shall also “cease to apply.” This, however,
means that a person will lose the status which is conveyed on
them through EU citizenship. This subsection will analyze
whether a similar reasoning as with national citizenship ought to
apply or whether different principles are at stake here. In order
to be able to address this question, the relationship between
national and EU citizenship needs to be analyzed. The specific
aspect which needs to be discussed is whether EU citizenship has
the potential or capacity to somehow stand alone.

99. See Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178, 184 (1992).
100. Perez, 356 U.S. 44, 65 (1958).
101. Id.
102. TEU, supra note 12, art. 50.3, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 44.
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A starting point for analyzing the relationship between
national and EU citizenship is to be found in the conclusions of
the Edinburgh Council Meeting of December 1992, where it was
highlighted that EU citizenship gives ‘additional rights’ but does
not replace national citizenship.103 How is this to be interpreted?
Denmark in the Annex to the Treaty made the following
declaration: “[c]itizenship of the Union is a political and legal
concept which is entirely different from the concept of citizenship
within the meaning of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Denmark and of the Danish legal system.”104 However, it seems
that not much is to be gained apart from the conclusion drawn
from this declaration, other than that EU citizenship differs
from national citizenship.
In Rottmann, 105 Advocate General Maduro found that
national and EU citizenship “are both inextricably linked and
independent.”106 Lippolis, in turn, argues with regard to their
relationship that they are “interlinked and not separable”;107
and he continues that “[t]he national citizenship is the primary
and original status, whereas the European citizenship which
derives from it, is a secondary citizenship. This means that being
a European citizen does not entitle one to become a citizen of one of
the Member States”;108 one could argue that this understanding
of EU citizenship exclusively defined through national
citizenship upholds ideas of state-sovereignty.
This finding is relatively unproblematic and coincides with
the wording of article 20 of the TFEU: “[c]itizenship of the
Union is hereby established. Every person holding the
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”109
Clearly this provision focuses on the creation of EU citizenship,
which seems closely related to national citizenship. However, the
103. Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.C. BULL., no.
456, at 53 (1992).
104. Denmark and the Treaty on European Union (Annex 3) art. 1, 1992 O.J. C
348/1, at 4 (emphasis added).
105. Rottmann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-1467.
106. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Rottmann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08,
[2010] E.C.R. I-1452, ¶ 23.
107. Vicenzo Lippolis, European Citizenship: What It Is and What It Could Be, in 3
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 317, 318 (Massimo La Torre
ed., 1998).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. TFEU, supra note 47, art. 20, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 56.
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problem of this Article is not so much the ‘creation’ but the
‘loss’; and here the Treaty as well as the literature seems to be
rather silent. This may not come as a surprise as withdrawal from
the European Union (and therefore loss of EU citizenship) has
(deliberately) remained unaddressed, specifically when EU
citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty.
The closest EU law and the ECJ have come to dealing with
the specific question on the loss of EU citizenship was in the
case of Rottmann. Rottmann, originally an Austrian citizen, lost
Austrian citizenship as a consequence of taking up German
citizenship, which he subsequently lost as he failed to disclose
on-going criminal investigations of serious fraud in Austria
during his naturalization in Germany; for Rottmann this would
result in loss of his status as an EU citizen. 110 The German
Federal Administrative Court sent, with another question, the
following query to the ECJ:
must the Member State . . . which has naturalised a citizen
of the Union and now intends to withdraw the
naturalisation obtained by deception, having due regard to
Community law, refrain altogether or temporarily from
withdrawing the naturalisation if or so long as that
withdrawal would have the legal consequence of loss of
citizenship of the Union (and of the associated rights and
fundamental freedoms) . . . , or is the Member State . . . of
the former nationality obliged, having due regard to
Community law, to interpret and apply, or even adjust, its
national law so as to avoid that legal consequence?111

All the Court had to say in this context was “that the
withdrawal of naturalisation acquired by the applicant in
Germany [had] not yet become definitive, and that no decision
concerning his status [had] been taken by the Member State
whose nationality he originally possessed, namely, the Republic
of Austria.”112 However, even if the Court had developed more
on this question it would still somehow differ from the
withdrawal situation: if a Member State withdraws from the
European Union, the question is not necessarily what happens
to national citizenship, but instead to EU citizenship. In other
110. Rottmann, [2010] E.C.R. I-1467, ¶¶ 22–27, 46, 59.
111. Id. ¶ 35.2.
112. Id. ¶ 61.
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words one could argue that Rottmann only describes an indirect
loss of EU citizenship (through the loss of national citizenship),
whereas withdrawal potentially leads to a direct loss of
citizenship. The question is, however, whether an argument can
be made that EU citizenship has an element of independence?
The first draft of article 5 of the Constitutional Treaty—
ironically called in German, “das Gerippe” or the skeleton—
originally spoke of “dual citizenship,” 113 which subsequently
changed during negotiations to “Citizenship of the Union shall
be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it,”114 a
wording which was also kept in article 20 of the Lisbon Treaty.
The word “additional” means “added,” ”other,” “more,” but
also “another”;115 but it also means that both “entities” at one
point can exist independently from each other. Kostakopoulou
comes to a similar conclusion when she argues that “the true
meaning of ‘additionality’ or ‘complementarity’ or ‘existing
alongside’ [delineates] a degree of relative autonomy and, by no
means, [implies] that A and B cannot function apart.”116
It comes as a surprise when reading the highly controversial
Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court, which
clearly stated that unilateral withdrawal is possible through an
actus contrarious, that the same court found that, “as a
consequence of EU citizenship introduced by the Maastricht
Treaty a durable legal bond is to be established amongst
nationals of the Member States.”117 It is interesting to note that
the Constitutional Court uses a different wording in the context
of citizenship compared to withdrawal, where it invoked the
113. Preliminary Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 5, 2002,
CON 369/02 (never ratified) (emphasis added).
114. Draft Constitutional Treaty, supra note 9, art I-10, 2004 O.J. C 310, at 13
(emphasis added).
115. NEW OXFORD THESAURUS OF ENGLISH (2000).
116. Dora Kostakopoulou, European Union Citizenship and Member State Nationality:
Updating or Upgrading the Link?, EUDO CITIZENSHIP, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/
commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-forum-cat/254-has-the-european-court-ofjustice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-law?showall=&start=5
(last
visited Sep. 19, 2013).
117. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12,
1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (¶ 97)
(Ger.) (“Mit der durch den Vertrag von Maastricht begründeten Unionsbürgerschaft
wird zwischen den Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten ein auf Dauer angelegtes
rechtliches Band geknüpft . . . .” (emphasis added) (author’s own translation)).
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somehow ‘weaker wording’ of the Treaty itself from article Q of
the TEU, which stated that the Treaty is concluded for auf
unbegrenzte Zeit or ‘an unlimited time.’118
In turn, when the German judges discussed the nature of
citizenship they used a different terminology to emphasize that
citizenship is a ‘durable’ or ‘permanent’ bond (‘auf Dauer’). Any
references to termination are missing but what is found instead
is a remark that EU and national citizenship differ only in the
“density of the bond.” 119 It almost seems as if the German
Constitutional Court acknowledged the importance of the status
conveyed through EU citizenship. The possible (unintended)
consequence of this difference is that EU citizenship appears to
be more robust than the Treaty which established this concept.
The argument to be made in this section was that one has
to distinguish between conditions under which one is entitled to
national citizenship and therefore EU citizenship, which is still
very much in the autonomous hands of Member States, and
circumstances where one loses EU citizenship either because of
loss of national citizenship (as was the case in Rottmann) or
because of withdrawal (national citizenship is retained but is no
longer considered a nationality of a Member State). None of the
Member States were forced to confer the status of EU
citizenship on their citizens but once they have, according to
this argument, they cannot simply withdraw this status.
Furthermore, EU citizenship, like national citizenship,
conveys an important status. After all, EU citizenship “is
required in order to preserve the link between the citizen and
the Union and his/her place in the European community of
citizens.” 120 Thus, this means that the normative reasoning
employed in the context of national citizenship also applies with
regard to EU citizenship. If this is so, then one of the
fundamental principles established in this section, that
citizenship cannot simply be taken away through a majority
decision, especially against the will of the individual, must apply
unless the entity of the Union would cease to exist, in which
case, the ‘link’ would no longer be needed.
118. The German word unbegrenzt still has the word ‘boundary’ in it (as has the
English word ‘limit’)—even if negated.
119. Cf. Maastricht, 89 BVERFGE 155 (¶ 97) (Ger.) (author’s own translation).
120. Kostakopoulou, supra note 116.
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CONCLUSION
A consequence of the argument developed in this Article is
that one needs to distinguish between the individual and
institutional level when it comes to the matter of withdrawal;
whether this is at all possible will be addressed (at least
cursorily) in this final concluding section. In this context,
attention should be drawn to two examples: the ‘EU-Swiss
model’ and the European Economic Area (“EEA”).121 Over the
years, the EEA served as a form of “antechamber to EU
membership for Austria, Sweden and Finland.”122 Therefore it
seems in a way plausible to make an argument that the EEA
could serve as an ‘exit-chamber’ for Member States which only
want to participate in the internal market. Given the fact that
there exists some sort of relationship between the European
Union and members of the EEA, it appears de facto possible
that individuals who do not wish to join their member state’s
downscaling in membership, could remain in a closer
relationship with the European Union.
The EEA model follows the logic one-size-fits all, whereas
the ‘EU-Swiss model,’123 is more tailored to the individual needs
of the EU partner. Given the European Union’s experiences
with the EU-Swiss model, however, it seems less likely to be an
option in the future. 124 Switzerland could be considered a
“‘quasi’ member state,”125 which has concluded several bilateral
agreements with the EU; these agreements even go so far as
Switzerland’s participation in the sovereignty-sensitive issue of
immigration, asylum, police and judicial cooperation.126 Again,
what one finds here is institutional cooperation without fullfledged institutional integration; this, in turn, amounts to
evidence that one can separate the institutional from the
individual integration. The situation described in this Article, of
course, would be the other way around. In this context, it would
121. Lazowski, supra note 45, at 534–39.
122. Id. at 534.
123. See id. at 536 (discussing the bilateral relationship between a former member
and the European Union).
124. Id. at 539.
125 . Sandra Lavenex, Switzerland’s Flexible Integration in the EU: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 547, 548 (2009).
126. Id. at 567.

174 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:147
be the individual who remains integrated and the institutional
level which disintegrates. This certainly would make things less
easy but it would necessarily mean that such an approach of
divided integration could be possible.
There might be a certain reluctance to understand
citizenship and the political community detached from territory.
One should not forget, however, that political communities in
ancient Greek, the polis, were not first and foremost perceived
as a community on a specific territory, but rather as a
community of people. Therefore, as Ottmann points out, it was
possible for Themistokles to relocate Athens on the ships; its
identity was not to be found in its soil but constitution.127 One is
strongly reminded of Habermas’ idea of constitutional
patriotism.128 I think it would be quite apt to understand EU
citizenship in this de-territorialized way; after all, countless wars
have been fought for territory and in order to overcome and
defend boundaries. The idea of European integration, however,
is a reaction to the fatal consequences of the nation state that is
built around these ingredients.
In the 1960s, Leonard B Boudin’s article in the Harvard
Law Review about the “Involuntary Loss of American
Nationality” began with the following paragraph: “The relatively
new concepts of nationality and nationalism may some day give
way to systems of world law and world government. Until that
time, problems of nationality, statelessness, and the rights and
obligations of citizens will continue to arise in a world of
independent nation-states.” 129 European integration itself has
always been at the forefront of changing our understanding of
international law, and, once again, it could be the case that we,
the citizens of Europe, may witness the next step in international
law.

127 . Henning Ottmann, Grenzen in einer Welt, die immer grenzenloser wird, in
GRENZEN UND GRENÜBERSCHREITUNGEN 334, 334 (Wolfram Hogrebe ed., 2004).
128. Cf. Jan-Werner Müller, On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism, 5 CONTEMP.
POL. THEORY 278 passim (2006).
129. Leonard B. Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1510, 1510 (1959–1960).

